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ABSTRACT This article examines the political role of a group of academic lawyers based at 
Thammasat University who have been seeking to reform various aspects of the Thai legal and 
judicial system. The seven-member strong group started out by criticising the illegality of the 
2006 coup. After the 2010 crackdown against redshirt protestors, the group named itself Nitirat 
and started to hold seminars, draft legal proposals, and campaign to amend various laws. Nitirat 
has repeatedly challenged the legal and constitutional underpinnings of three key elements of the 
Thai state: the judiciary, the military, and the monarchy. In doing so, the group has gained a 
mass following, drawn mainly from those sympathetic to the “redshirt” movement which broadly 
supports former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Informally led by scholar Worajet 
Pakeerat, Nitirat has created a popular branding which is reflected in huge audiences for public 
events, and the sales of souvenirs. The article aims to answer the following questions: How does 
Nitirat combine the roles of legal academic and political activist? How does it differ from the 
traditional mode of Thai public intellectuals? How significant is the Nitirat phenomenon? 
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In 2014, Worajet Pakeerat became one of the first Thai civilians to be court-martialled since 
1976.1 Worajet was no ordinary civilian: a distinguished law professor at Thammasat University 
and a former holder of the prestigious Ananda Mahidol royal scholarship, he was a leading critic 
of legal abuses by Thailand’s military. Following the May 22, 2014, military seizure of power, 
the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta arbitrarily summoned and detained 
hundreds of people including academics, journalists, media hosts, politicians and student 
activists; and established a military court to try cases that threatened “national security,” such as 
acts of defiance against the junta. This repressive climate contrasted starkly with the animated 
political debates that had erupted in Thai society over the previous four years, initiated by a 
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group of legal academics turned public intellectuals known as Nitirat. It is no coincidence that 
Nitirat, led by Worajet, formed an important target for the NCPO. 
Nitirat began life as “The Group of Thammasat Law Lecturers” (henceforth TLL), an ad 
hoc, four-member strong group formed in the wake of the September 19, 2006, military coup (on 
the 2006 coup, see Connors and Hewison 2008). The group comprised Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, 
Teera Suteewarangkurn, Prasit Piwawattanapanich and Worajet Pakirat. They were joined 
shortly afterwards by Thapanan Nipithakul, and were known for a time as the “the group of five 
Thammasat law lecturers.” The group only assumed the name “Nitirat” in 2010, on the fourth 
anniversary of the coup, by which time it comprised seven publicly declared members: Worajet 
Pakeerat, Jantajira Eiamayura, Thapanan Nipithakul, Teera Suteewarangkurn, Sawatree Suksri, 
Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, and Prasit Piwawattanapanich. The group also has two unofficial 
associate members, including Phuttipong Ponganekgul, a law student who functions as its 
secretary and another working behind the scenes who wished not to be named.2 Over the years, 
the membership of the group has fluctuated slightly. For example, Poonthep Sirinupong joined 
the group, while Prasit went to study abroad and has not returned to Nitirat. Generally, though, 
membership has been restricted to full-time academics teaching at the Thammasat University 
Faculty of Law – though Nitirat has welcomed support from lecturers at other universities and 
faculties. 
This article is based on 19 semi-structured interviews with a range of informants, 
including all seven members of Nitirat; as well as participant observation at a number of the 
group’s events in 2012 and 2013, a close reading of articles and other publications by and about 
Nitirat, and the viewing of relevant video materials. The article raises some important questions 
about the group: How do members of Nitirat combine the roles of legal academic and political 
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activist? How do they differ from the earlier model of Thai public intellectuals who 
communicated mainly through newspaper columns? How significant is Nitirat for Thailand’s 
politics? 
 
ORIGINATING DISSENT 
 
The Thammasat University Law Faculty has a long and distinguished history. Thammasat was 
founded in 1934 as the University of Moral and Political Sciences by Pridi Banomyong, a 
French-educated former judge, and the leading intellectual behind the People’s Party (คณะราษฎร 
Khana Ratsadon or, in short, Khanarat), which ended the absolute monarchy in 1932.3 The 
People’s Party, Nitirat’s inspiration, was not a group of academics, but of elite revolutionaries 
dedicated to the transformation of the existing political order. During its early years, Thammasat 
was thus seen as a bastion of liberalism, in contrast with the older, more conservative 
Chulalongkorn University, which was closely linked to the monarchy. However, Pridi was 
forced into exile in 1949, and in subsequent decades – especially following the bloody 
crackdown against the student movement which took place on the university campus on October 
6, 1976 – Thammasat became markedly less progressive in orientation. Thammasat graduates 
also came to dominate the upper echelons of the judiciary. By the onset of the twenty-first 
century, law at Thammasat was largely a conservative faculty with a progressive past. Forming 
TLL/Nitirat was an attempt to reclaim and revive that past, revisiting the spirit and inspiration of 
the People’s Party. 
For university lecturers to address non-academic audiences is nothing new; by the early 
1990s prominent academics such as Nidhi Eoseewong, Chai-Anan Samudavanija, and Kasian 
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Tejapira were developing parallel careers as popular columnists in the pages of Manager, 
Matichon and other newspapers, and before long these secondary activities were beginning to 
eclipse their work as scholars (McCargo 2000, 156-60; see also Chetana 1993; Thongchai 1994; 
Kasian 1996). Conservative reformers such as Thirayuth Boonmi and Prawase Wasi were also in 
great demand as speakers and commentators. By the second decade of the new millennium, 
prominent public intellectuals were becoming Facebook stars, their opinions, musings and even 
personal spats tracked on social media by avid followers. Yet Nitirat, though also active on 
social media, was the first real Thai academic celebrities, able consistently to pack huge rooms 
with enthusiastic (though never pliable) members of the public. 
In theory, the Nitirat group of critical legal academics does not have a leader. In practice, 
however, Worajet acknowledges that he is considered the prime mover (interview, Worajet 
Pakirat, December 22, 2012), while Piyabutr – with his youthful looks and accessible speaking 
manner – enjoys strong following among the group’s supporters, largely because of his 
outspoken comments on the monarchy. Sawatree also has her own following, while other 
members are somewhat less prominent. Nitirat is more a virtual than a formal organisation, does 
not accept donations, has no office and employs no staff. 
 
THAILAND’S CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Since 2005, the public sphere has been highly polarised between supporters and opponents of 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was an ex-police officer turned 
telecommunications tycoon turned politician, who was supported by many and detested by many 
others . Thaksin won two landslide elections in 2001 and 2005, but was ousted in a military coup 
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in 2006 (Pasuk and Baker 2009). Since 2006 pro-Thaksin parties have won two more elections, 
but have faced intense opposition from conservative networks linking the monarchy, the military 
and the Democrat Party. Conflicts between pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin forces have regularly 
spilled onto Bangkok’s streets: yellow-shirted anti-Thaksin groups staged mass demonstrations 
in 2006, 2008, and 2013-4, while red-shirted pro-Thaksin groups held huge rallies in 2009 and 
2010. While the majority of voters supported pro-Thaksin parties in successive elections, after 
2006 most middle class Bangkokians leaned in an anti-Thaksin direction – including most 
university lecturers. Nitirat is among a small group of prominent academics bucking the 
prevailing conservative trend. 
Thailand has undergone very rapid socio-economic change since the early 1960s, 
characterised by high levels of economic growth and enormous expansion of the industrial and 
service sectors. While agri-business continues to be a major element of the economy, the number 
of Thais who earn a living primarily by working the land has declined dramatically. Millions 
now divide their time between the populous provinces of the North and Northeast – where they 
remain registered to vote – and urban areas, especially greater Bangkok. These “urbanised 
villagers” form the bedrock of support for pro-Thaksin parties, and for the red shirt movement 
more broadly (Merieau 2013, 9-11). Urbanised villagers have urban aspirations, seek to advance 
themselves economically, and reject the patronising attitudes of the Bangkok elite who depict 
them as uneducated and unfit to participate in politics. Their socio-economic grievances are 
linked to suppressed regional and linguistic identities (Naruemon and McCargo 2011). 
Relatively few Thais would describe themselves as anti-monarchy; but many, including 
large numbers of urbanised villagers, are resentful of the Bangkok establishment and would like 
to see greater political space, more opportunity for free expression, and more decentralisation of 
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power. Thaksin and his allies have been able to successfully exploit both the aspirations and 
resentments of these people, which could be clearly seen in the 2010 red shirt protests in 
Bangkok. Yet although red shirt leaders such as Jatuporn Prompan and Nattawut Saikua are 
extremely popular, their rabble-rousing upcountry image has limited appeal to the Bangkok 
middle classes, and so poses little psychological threat to the establishment.  
But what if arguments and complaints closely resembling some red shirt views were 
voiced by a group of highly respectable middle-class Bangkokians, validated by their social 
status as lecturers at a prestigious university? Enter Nitirat, which was perfectly placed to 
exacerbate the fears of the urban middle class as their perceived sense of natural entitlement and 
prestige continued to unravel before their eyes (journalist interview, February 23, 2013). 
 
BRANDING DISSENT 
 
The original TLL group was criticised for misusing the name of Thammasat University – since 
they did not represent the views of the majority of lecturers in the Faculty of Law. As Teera put 
it, “To stop this annoyance and to create our own brand, we came up with the name, Nitirat 
(interview, December 12, 2012). Their full name is Nitirat: nitisat phua ratsadon (นิติราษฎร์ : 
นิติศาสตร์เพื่อราษฎร, translated as Nitirat: Legal studies for the people); the short name echoes the 
shortened Thai name of the People’s Party, Khanarat, whilst the use of the word ratsadon (ราษฎร -
- people) makes the point doubly clear (interview, Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, December 14, 2012). 
In Teera’s words: “By referring to Khanarat, we are inheriting their legacy (สืบเจตนา).  We are 
taking up their aspiration, which had disappeared, and bringing it back. We are not saying we 
want to compare ourselves to them, but rather inherit their aspirations” (interview, Teera). 
7 
 
On one occasion, Worajet declared in public that Nitirat had taken over (รับงาน) the 
People’s Party work (interview, Thapanan Nipithakul, March 15, 2013). Nitiratsadon was 
discussed as a possible name, but rejected on the grounds that it was too long. The group also 
adopted an English name, “Enlightened Jurists,” suggested by Piyabutr, who wanted to convey 
positive connotations of brightness and light (interview, Piyabutr). The use of the word “people” 
reflected an explicit desire to connect with a wider public beyond the academic sphere, and 
alluded to Thammasat’s pre-1960 status as an open enrolment university. The three terms Nitirat, 
Enlightened Jurists, and “legal studies for the people” summarised a range of aspirations: an 
outward-facing, forward-thinking grouping that nevertheless was explicit in expressing nostalgia 
for the legacy of Pridi and the People’s Party, and derived legitimacy from the legal and 
academic credentials of its members. While no longer using the name of Thammasat University, 
Nitirat evoked an imagined Thammasat – one that may or may not have actually existed in the 
Pridi era – at the core of what leading members referred to as their “brand.” 
The language of “branding,” derived from the fields of advertising and marketing, might 
seem far removed from academic debates about progressive legal reforms. Here lies an important 
difference between Nitirat and earlier generations of public intellectuals; for Nitirat, raised in a 
booming economy where the tenets of management literature have shaped popular 
consciousness, notions of marketing and self-promotion are second nature. In interviews, 
Piyabutr, Teera, and Thapanan all made unprompted references to Nitirat’s “brand,” which was 
linked to their choice of both name and logo. Just as Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party, which 
deployed images and slogans crafted by marketing consultants (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 99-
102; see also Nichapa 2003), so Nitirat academics were among the first academics to embrace 
modern modes of public relations. The group commissioned a website and logo, launched to 
8 
 
coincide with their re-branding as Nitirat in September 2010 (interview, Sawatree Suksri, 
November 14, 2012; interview, activist, June 11, 2013). No Nitirat event is complete without 
stalls selling a range of t-shirts and other accessories, bearing the group’s logo – including 
cartoon stickers depicting judges as dinosaurs. One journalist explained:  
 
Another thing is that Nitirat looks good. Each of them looks good: cool, handsome and 
pretty. Like celebrities. Especially since previously, we had only Phi Tu [Jatuporn]! 
[laughs] So provincial! (แบบลูกทุ่ง!) But after the look changed to Nitirat, wow! Middle 
class, good looking, smart and stuff. I think this worked to penetrate the hearts of those 
who hold different perspectives, to penetrate the hearts of the “salims” [a mildly 
derogatory term for the anti-Thaksin middle-class] to make them pay more attention. If 
Phi Tu were speaking, they may not even listen (interview, February 23, 2013). 
 
Nitirat did not invent anti-establishment dissent – which had already been on abundant 
display on the streets of the capital between March and May 2010. But Nitirat did re-brand that 
dissent to make it appear “educated” and middle class. 
 
LEGALISM AND HYPER-LEGALISM 
 
Thongchai Winichakul (2008, 32) has criticised the judicial system’s “solid record of siding with 
whoever is in power.” Nitirat has made similar claims about the legal profession more generally. 
Prominent jurists and legal academics have been repeatedly pressed into service following 
military interventions into politics. In the wake of the September 19, 2006 military coup, jurists 
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Borwornsak Uwanno, Wissanu Krea-ngam and Meechai Ruchuphan joined the team created by 
the junta to draft an interim constitution. All had lengthy track records of similar service to 
regimes of various political persuasions, both elected and otherwise.4 One important issue that 
defined Nitirat members and set them apart from others in the legal field was their steadfast 
public opposition to the 2006 military coup and its aftermath. They argued that turning a blind 
eye to the illegality of successive military coups was a problem permeating the entire legal field. 
As Piyabutr stated in an interview, “ it is very difficult to find a lawyer who would oppose the 
coup. Back then, [after the September 19, 2006, coup,] we discussed how nobody from this field 
opposed the coup at all; everyone “indulged” it (เสพสม). So we decided to get together.” 
Mainstream media outlets all declined to publish TLL’s critical statements about the military 
coup; the statement eventually appeared only in alternative outlets such as the Prachatai website 
(interview, Pinpaka Ngamsom, January 21, 2013). 
Following the coup, the junta undertook various legal manoeuvres to entrench its 
influence. These included an interim constitution that gave the coup-makers amnesty, the junta-
appointed Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the new 2007 constitution, and the controversial 
popular referendum to validate it. TLL tried to persuade society that these manoeuvres were all 
illegitimate, pointing out, for example, that any charter clause granting amnesty to coup-makers 
was a constitutional self-contradiction (TLL 2007b). 
The most important contribution of TLL was their criticism of the complicity of the 
judicial process in the coup. In an interview, Worajet argued that the coup began in September 
2006 when the military overthrew the Thaksin-led government, but was only completed in May 
2007 when the new junta-appointed Constitutional Tribunal dissolved Thaksin’s party (Worajet 
2012a, 188). The Tribunal dissolved the Thai Rak Thai Party and banned 111 party executives 
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from political office for five years for election fraud. TLL criticised the verdict for utilising a 
coup decree (Announcement 27, Clause 3) retroactively to ban politicians (TLL 2007a). TLL 
also argued that the tribunal had unreasonably punished all executive members for abuses 
committed by the party. The People’s Power Party was subsequently established as Thai Rak 
Thai’s successor and was voted into office in December 2007, only to be dissolved again by the 
Constitutional Court a year later, again on grounds of electoral fraud. Similarly, its executives 
and leaders were banned from politics for five years. TLL criticised this ruling as well, arguing 
that the Constitutional Court had declined to examine any witnesses or evidence presented by the 
defendants, displaying an extreme lack of objectivity (TLL 2008). 
In the eyes of TLL members, other Thaksin-related lawsuits had also fallen prey to a 
politicised judicial process, notably cases filed by the junta-established Assets Examination 
Committee (AEC) (Matichon, May 30, 2012). Indeed, the AEC had been created specifically to 
file lawsuits against Thaksin and his party. On the verdict, Worajet contended “the reasons 
offered [for these verdicts] are not reasonable.… When you adjudicate in court, there must be a 
standard that applies not only to Thaksin but to everyone” (interview, Worajet). For instance, 
though Worajet believed Thaksin undeniably had conflicts of interest during his premiership, 
TTL argued that in convicting Thaksin for conflict of interest, the court had based its judgment 
on simple calculations about his increased share values, without stating which of Thaksin’s 
improper actions led to their increase (interview, Worajet; TLL 2010). 
In September 2011, on the fifth anniversary of the coup, Nitirat made its most radical move 
to that point, proposing the “nullification of the consequences of the 19 September 2006 coup.” 
Nitirat called for: 
11 
 
1. The “nullification” of the coup and any legal actions pursued by the coup-makers during 
the period from September 19 to 30, 2006. They shall be treated as if they never 
happened or had any legal effect. 
2. The nullification of constitutional clauses providing legal immunity for coup makers 
(Section 36 and 37 of the 2006 Interim Constitution of Thailand). 
3. The nullification of verdicts related to politicians made by the Constitutional Tribunal, 
the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court that relied on the 2006 coup decrees or 
which were initiated as a consequence of the coup, in particular those initiated by the 
junta-appointed Assets Examination Committee. 
4. The discontinuation of lawsuits and investigations by the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission, the Anti-Money Laundering Office, and the Office of the Auditor General. 
5. An acknowledgement that neither the nullification of verdicts (3) nor the discontinuation 
of lawsuits (4) constituted expungement. These cases could be filed again through 
standard legal procedures and judged on their merits. 
6. A constitutional amendment which included the above points. The amendment should 
then be validated by a popular referendum (Nitirat 2011). 
In contrast with TLL/Nitirat’s earlier statements, the nullification proposal had immediate 
political and social implications. It called for a decisive break with the tradition of colluding with 
coup-makers and granting them impunity: TLL showed how the framework of the existing 
justice system could be deployed to hold coup-makers accountable, revoke illegitimate laws, and 
overturn illegitimate verdicts. 
Coup nullification became a topic of public controversy and debate. Launched in 
conjunction with a call to amend the controversial lèse-majesté law,5 the proposal stirred so 
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much public response that Siam Intelligence Unit (SIU 2011), a private think tank, dubbed this 
phenomenon the “Nitirat effect.” Over the following 10 days, during which Nitirat held another 
seminar to clarify the details of the proposal, SIU counted over 30 responses reported by the 
media, mostly critical, from prominent figures including the deputy prime minister, prime 
minister’s spokesperson, leaders of the opposition, army generals, yellow shirt leaders, red shirt 
leaders, academics, jurists, writers and prominent media columnists. 
In the end, the overt hostility of their conservative critics backfired and provided a public 
relations bonanza for Nitirat. Piyabutr recalled a week of “bombardment” against Nitirat after the 
first seminar on September 18, which resulted in an explosion of attendance at the second 
seminar on September 25 (interview, Piyabutr). The proposal to nullify the coup transformed 
Nitirat from a relatively obscure academic group to a much more prominent player on the 
political stage. 
The proposal set the tone for Nitirat’s subsequent campaigns. Nitirat found fault with a 
political order in which legal practitioners, judges, and academic lawyers had consistently sided 
with the establishment and supported conservative positions. But Nitirat did not argue that 
lawyers had excessive influence in society; simply that they had used their influence badly. A 
more radical critique would argue that Thailand was suffering from hyper-legalism, as seen in 
the country’s record-breaking number of constitutions. Fred Riggs (1966, 53) argued long ago 
that “Constitutionalism was not designed so much to constrain the rulers as to facilitate their 
rule.” Nearly half a century later, the large and ever-ready constitution-drafting industry – one 
symptom of a “political disease” of restless constitutional tampering (McCargo 1998, 7) – was 
simply the most obvious manifestation of excessive faith in legal solutions. At the same time, far 
too much respect were paid to judges and to prominent lawyers, whose willingness to serve those 
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in power had rendered them virtually untouchable. The high water-mark of Thai 
constitutionalism, the much-heralded 1997 “People’s Constitution,” with its raft of rights and 
entourage of independent state agencies, singularly failed to firm up the legitimacy of electoral 
politics. In sum, legal conservatism forms part of a wider problem of hyper-legalism: an exalted 
belief in the efficacy of legal measures, despite the fact that a succession of constitutions has 
done nothing to stabilise the country’s political order Hence the conclusions reached by Harding 
and Leyland (2011, 255) in their study of Thai constitutionalism: 
 
In our view the solution is certainly not to draft another constitution from scratch in 
search of some constitutional nirvana which might be achieved by a particular form of 
words. Rather than attempting to introduce a radically new constitution, the factions 
simply need to agree to work with a particular constitution as the basis for a political 
settlement. 
 
By contrast, Nitirat was intensely critical of legal conservatism, but remained embedded in 
hyper-legalism, persistently arguing that political problems could readily be addressed through 
new or better laws, and even aspiring to draft a new constitution of its own (interview, Piyabutr).  
 
THE QUESTION OF MONARCHY 
 
One area where Nitirat had a significant impact was on the limits of free expression, especially 
concerning the monarchy. Prior to the 2006 coup, critical discussion of the monarchy in the 
public sphere was extremely limited. The monarchy’s political role is difficult to debate and 
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analyse for a number of reasons. McCargo (2005) coined the term “network monarchy” to 
describe the monarchy’s indirect mode of political power: this indirectness conceals the 
institution’s very real influence, much of it exerted behind the scenes or through extra-
constitutional means. Streckfuss (2011, 277-85) has argued that applications of lèse-majesté in 
Thailand have resulted in a “truth regime” that locates the monarchy within the sacred sphere; 
the prohibition of rigorous historical discussion of the monarchy has shrouded the institution in 
nationalist myths and ceremonial eulogies. In recent decades, fear of transgressing socially-
accepted norms and anxiety concerning possible accusations of lèse-majesté have served to 
foster a cautious silence that further sacralises the monarchy. As Thongchai (2008, 19) observes: 
“During the past 50 years or so those who think otherwise have been penalised or under self-
censorship in order to avoid trouble due to the serious nature of the lèse-majesté charge and the 
threat of rebuke from other people.” Thongchai (2012) argues that the resulting mind-set 
implicitly extends the formal boundaries of lèse-majesté to create what he terms a culture of 
“hyper-royalism.” The conviction of a man by the Supreme Court in late 2013 for lèse-majesté 
for allegedly criticising Rama IV (who died in 1868) supports Thongchai’s argument: the law is 
supposed to apply only to the current king, queen, heir to the throne, and regent. 
The monarchy’s acceptance of the 2006 coup, royal advice for judges to act righteously – 
advice that appeared to influence a series of verdicts against Thaksin – and clear displays of 
support for the anti-Thaksin yellow shirt movement in 2008 triggered overt criticism of the 
institution (McCargo 2009, 14-15). As government and military pressure against the red shirt 
movement grew stronger, so did the intensity and frequency of criticism against Bangkok’s 
establishment. Red shirt leader Veera Musikapong sarcastically depicted the red shirts as 
“orphans,” children left behind by their “father,” a term often used by royalists for the king 
15 
 
(ASTV/Manager Online, April 10, 2010). The increase in lèse-majesté cases from an average of 
five new charges per year in the previous decade to an average of 191 charges per year during 
the period 2006-09 indicates both that the monarchy has become an increasingly controversial 
issue and that the tolerance for such debate has been very low (Streckfuss 2011, 6, 195). The 
statistics on internet censorship were equally astonishing: 77,491 URLs were censored for lèse-
majesté between 2007 and 2012 (Sawatree, Siriphon, and Orapin 2012; Sawatree 2013).  
Nitirat’s attempts to challenge limits on free expression formed part of a wider social 
movement to amend the lèse-majesté law, though this was not an issue Nitirat had focused on 
from the beginning. In its early years, TTL’s discussion of the monarchy was largely limited to 
the correct interpretation of the monarchy’s function in a constitutional democracy. In contrast to 
the popular understanding that being “above politics” meant that the monarchy was at the 
pinnacle of power, TLL insisted that the monarchy should be “above politics” in the sense of 
being outside politics (Piyabutr 2007, 2009; Worajet 2012a, 52). The monarchy should have no 
political power, and hence no political responsibilities (see Thongchai [2008, 14-15] for a 
discussion of how the discourse of the King’s being “above” politics legitimized the 2006 coup). 
The issue was graphically illustrated in the run-up to the 2006 coup, when the anti-Thaksin 
royalist “yellow shirt” movement, officially known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD), called for Thaksin to be replaced by a royally-appointed prime minister. The PAD 
claimed this demand was in accordance with Article 7 of the constitution (Connors 2008a, 148-
51). Article 7 states that where no provisions exist, “traditions/conventions of government” must 
be followed, but does not define these traditions or conventions.6 The PAD insisted that Article 7 
referred to royal sovereignty. Piyabutr (2007, 60) later argued that the PAD had deliberately 
misinterpreted the law, insisting that the traditions of Thailand’s “democratic form of 
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government with the King as Head of State” do not allow the king to make political decisions; 
other bodies must exercise sovereign power on his behalf. Piyabutr observed that the PAD’s 
distorted interpretation relied on the king’s popularity; theirs was an ill-considered attempt to 
oust Thaksin through any available means. 
Nitirat’s fame – and notoriety – grew after holding a seminar on the monarchy in 
December 2010. Only then did it begin to attract large audiences to its events (interview, 
Piyabutr). Recordings of the seminar became a best-selling CD at red shirt rallies (interview, 
journalist, February 23, 2013). Nitirat members were now on the road to becoming celebrities, 
with a mass appeal to audiences far outside academic circles. From early 2011, Nitirat developed 
a systematic critique of the lèse-majesté law and associated royalist ideology. Nitirat criticised 
several aspects of the law, including the harsh jail terms for those convicted, its status as a crime 
against national security (allowing anyone to file a complaint), and questionable practices related 
to its application, such as default denial of bail for alleged offenders.7 For Nitirat, these legal 
aberrations reflected an outdated royalist ideology held by state officials and especially by 
judges, as opposed to a democratic ideology, which would prioritise rights and freedoms. 
On January 15, 2012, Nitirat co-instigated the first sustained and expensive campaign in 
recent Thai politics to change the lèse-majesté law (known as Article 112). The Committee for 
the Amendment of the Article 112 (CCAA 112) was created to oversee the campaign. It 
consisted of a broad coalition of activists, writers, artists, and academics, most of whom either 
self-identified as red shirts or were red shirt sympathisers.8 Launched several months after the 
controversial proposal to nullify the coup, the unprecedented scale of the campaign generated 
tremendous publicity, much of it hostile, and intensified the controversy surrounding Nitirat. 
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Nitirat held a second mass event a week later, at which it proclaimed its determination to 
follow up Article 112 reform by overhauling all the major institutions of the state – including the 
military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary – topped with a provocative demand for a new oath 
to be sworn by the monarch. These proposals for radical reforms were the most explicit 
statement so far of Nitirat’s larger agenda, and had the effect of intensifying the conservative 
backlash. In retrospect, the aggressive approach taken in the second event was counter-
productive, obscuring the logic of the original proposal and mobilising hostile voices. While 
Worajet acknowledged this might have been a tactical mistake, he defended Nitirat by insisting 
somewhat disingenuously that its members were merely academics: “We are not a political 
movement in that we do not consider political strategies” (interview, Worajet). 
Hostile responses aside, Nitirat also received encouragement and help from many sources 
for the campaign. For instance, award-winning writers such as Sujit Wongthet and Prabda Yoon 
showed solidarity with the Article 112 campaign by heading a parallel move to gather signatures 
from writers (Matichon, January 12, 2012). One notable means of expressing solidarity was via 
the use of social media. Facebook users who supported the campaign attached the Nitirat button 
to their profile pictures and used Nitirat banners as their cover photos. Over the course of 112 
days, CCAA 112 collected 39,185 signatories, but ultimately submitted only 26,958 since many 
of the forms were not filled out correctly. After Parliament bizarrely responded to CCAA 112 
that around 31,000 signatories of the 26,958 submitted were valid (personal communication, 
CCAA 112 member, May 8, 2013), the petition was turned down by the President of Parliament 
with a one-line response that the amendment was “Not in accordance with the provision on 
Rights and Liberties of Thai People, Chapter 3, and Directive Principles of Fundamental State 
Policies, Chapter 5” of the 2007 constitution. This decision was challenged by Nitirat and CCAA 
18 
 
112, but to no avail as indicated by a reply letter back from the Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives to the CCAA 112 on October 11, 2012.  
The campaign’s limited success partly reflected Nitirat’s political naiveté. Despite the 
support noted above, the group made no significant attempt to build a broad alliance for Article 
112 reform, despite the fact that even some prominent royalists had called for change. Just a few 
days before the launch of the Nitirat campaign, former attorney general and Truth for 
Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) chairman Kanit Na Nakorn proposed reforming 
the law, reducing the maximum jail term to seven years and making the Bureau of Royal 
Household responsible for bringing forward all cases. Nitirat’s proposal was quite similar: 
reducing the maximum jail sentence to three years, and making the Office of His Majesty’s 
Principal Private Secretary responsible for bringing forward all cases. Nitirat never sought to 
create a common cause with Kanit or other advocates of Article 112 reforms, preferring to go it 
alone. At one point, Kanit even invited Nitirat to a TRCT panel to discuss the problems of 
Article 112 but Nitirat declined, reasoning that it had “already made public statements so if he 
[Kanit] wanted to continue Nitirat’s work [in his own capacity], he could” (interview, Phuttipong 
Ponganekgul, June 25, 2013). Within the CCAA 112, Nitirat limited its role to proposing and 
explaining the law, relegating the task of alliance building to others. The first campaign 
signatories comprised mostly of academics who self-identified as either red or neutral. Though 
lack of diversity among signatories was a concern – Puangthong Pawakapan, coordinator of the 
CCAA 112, claimed the royalists she approached declined to sign up – the lack of priority placed 
on alliance building made it unsurprising that the great majority of signatures gathered were from 
red supporters (interview, Puangthong Pawakapan, June 13, 2013). 
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More surprisingly, the amendment proposal was not especially well received by the 
majority of those who signed the petition. The loud cheers at the two Nitirat seminars held in 
January 2012 whenever there was a suggestion of abolishing the lèse-majesté law indicated that 
many, if not the majority, in the audience favoured abolition over reform (field notes, January 
15, 2012). Tellingly, those who joined the rally to submit the petition to Parliament yelled 
“Abolish!” even though CCAA 112 members tried to get them to yell “Amend!” (interview Wad 
Ravee, CCAA 112 member,  June 15, 2013). The proposal to reduce the length of jail terms was 
presented by the group as a pragmatic compromise. Yet many Nitirat supporters would have 
preferred to see custodial sentences eliminated altogether. A lot of those who signed the petition 
did so in spite of the detailed legal proposals crafted by Nitirat, rather than because of them: they 
supported the petition simply as a significant move in the right direction. Nitirat had crafted a 
new lèse-majesté law that appealed to virtually nobody except itself. 
Nitirat delegated campaigning tasks to other members of the CCAA 112, including 
academics from other fields, because members were anxious to preserve a scholarly detachment. 
It was only when rumours started circulating that the campaign might fail to gather enough 
signatures that Nitirat began visiting the provinces (interview, CCAA 112 member interview, 
January 29, 2013). In sum, Nitirat drafted a compromise bill, one which retained jail terms for 
lèse-majesté and did not sit well with most prospective signatories; but the drafters were 
reluctant to engage in the kind of pragmatic bridge-building that would have been needed to 
create a broad political alliance. Given how uninspiring the Article 112 reform proposal was, and 
how reluctant Nitirat had been actively to promote the petition, it is an impressive testimony to 
the strength of feeling that so many signatures were collected. 
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Overall, the Article 112 campaign further burnished Nitirat’s standing, reputation and 
notoriety. The group became a rallying point for those who believed much-needed changes to the 
law were both legally and socially possible. Members of the CCAA 112 considered the 
campaign a success in terms of opening up greater public discussion and debate about the role of 
the monarchy. While their core demand– reform of the problematic lèse-majesté law – was 
eminently reasonable, group members made strategic and tactical blunders in advancing their 
cause, crafting a legalistic compromise which they tried to advance through dogmatic methods. 
Reforming Article 112 was a difficult proposition, not least because judges often saw themselves 
as servants of the king, dedicated to following the wishes of the monarchy. 
 
PROBLEMATISING THE JUDICIARY 
 
In two remarkable speeches given on April 25, 2006, King Bhumibol urged judges to help 
resolve the country’s political problems, which he described as “the worst crisis in the world” 
(Manager Online April 30, 2006). Over the next few years, judges of the Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Court, Constitutional Tribunal and Administrative Court made a series of 
contentious decisions that undermined pro-Thaksin forces. These included annulling the results 
of the 2006 general election (a decision made in 2006), dissolving various political parties (in 
2007, 2008), banning Thaksin and numerous of his allies from political office for five year 
periods (2007, 2008), removing Samak Sundaravej  from office for illegally hosting a television 
cooking programme (2008), sentencing the self-exiled Thaksin to a two year jail term in absentia 
(2008) confiscating a large proportion of Thaksin’s assets (2010), and declaring the 2014 
21 
 
election null and void (2014) and retrospectively removing Yingluck Shinawatra from office 
(2014).  
For many, especially for critics of Thaksin, the growing involvement of the courts in 
politics was a positive development. Prominent Thammasat social critic Thirayuth Boonmi 
(2006) argued that Thailand was experiencing a “judicialization of politics;” the judicial system 
was expanding its role in order to help citizens keep political bodies accountable, thereby 
improving the quality of democracy and discouraging corruption. But for Nitirat, this new 
pattern of judicialisation was an alarming trend; it argued that the actions of the courts resembled 
a series of judicial coups, aimed not at implementing the law, but at serving the political interests 
of the country’s traditional elite. Piyabutr argued that the legitimacy of the courts had been 
exploited instrumentally for partisan ends (interview, Piyabutr). 
The allegation that the judiciary – including judges of the “independent” Constitutional 
Court, some of whom were not career jurists9 – serves the interests of the political establishment 
is already a serious one. But Nitirat’s criticisms of the judiciary do not begin or end with the 
highly charged period around the time of the 2006 military coup. For Nitirat, the willingness of 
the judiciary to do the bidding of the monarchy, the military and the traditional elite reflected 
long-term structural problems in Thailand’s legal system. The courts had never checked the 
military’s repeated seizure of power, the abrogation of constitutions or its impunity. Many judges 
see themselves as working on behalf of the monarchy, rather than administering laws which 
belong to the people under a constitutional order. Nitirat has argued that this crucial 
misunderstanding goes to the core of Thailand’s legal and political problems, reflecting how the 
end of the absolute monarchy did not produce a fundamental shift in judicial culture and thinking 
(Worajet 2012b). 
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One essential driving force behind both hyper-legalism and the exaggerated respect for 
judges is the understanding of law as a highly technical matter. Legal education has helped create 
a culture that prizes technical knowledge, detached from its social and political context. 
Facetiously dubbing the discipline “legal letters studies,” former Chiang Mai University dean of 
law Somchai Preechasilpakul has argued that over the past several decades, the study of law has 
been characterised by an emphasis on rote memory of legal statutes and previous Supreme Court 
rulings (Somchai 2010). The verdicts of Supreme Court justices are considered definitive; they 
serve as correct answers in the bar examinations and no points are earned by criticising them. 
Law programmes offered at universities mimic the approach adopted by the Bar Association and 
are essentially a preliminary preparation for the Bar. This leaves legal education little room for 
competing interpretations. Most law programmes do not offer courses that examine normative 
assessments of the law and the reasons offered by the courts. After being schooled in cut-and-
dried technical understandings, judges are recruited through a highly competitive entrance 
examination – essentially a much more difficult version of the Bar examination – typically when 
they are in their mid-twenties, and often have no other professional or life experience. By 
passing the rigorous entrance examination, judges assume their place at the pinnacle of the legal-
justice hierarchy. Nidhi Eoseewong (2013) compares the expertise of judges to that of respected 
technicians such as skilled barbers or typists; jobs that may be performed without any critical 
reflexivity. 
Particularly alarming for the judiciary were Nitirat’s detailed and academically-grounded 
critiques of important judgments, which challenged the monopoly of judges as the arbiters of 
legal wisdom. Before Nitirat’s formation, TLL began criticising court verdicts with the 2007 and 
2008 party dissolution decisions. As time went on, Nitirat complemented its analyses of 
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judgements with criticisms of the judicial institutions and organisational culture which produced 
these contentious verdicts. In March 2013, it drafted an “Open Letter to Judges in Thailand,” 
outlining how different court decisions related to Article 112 have violated legal principles, 
arguing that courts ignored the principle of “benefit of the doubt,” there was a ritual-like denial 
of bail requests without any substantive reason and the Constitutional Court’s affirmation that 
Article 112 was constitutional, without offering legal reasons but rather a “lavish description” of 
the monarchy (Nitirat 2013). Most impressively, it invited a former Deputy Chief Justice to read 
aloud the open letter on its behalf, so upending the culture of judicial seniority. 
While strict contempt of court laws combined with lack of technical knowledge have 
generally inhibited the media from openly questioning verdicts, criticisms of the courts from 
within the Thammasat University Law Faculty challenged the institutional structures of authority 
and deeply-held notions of deference. By highlighting problems in the workings of the judicial 
system, and disputing the legal logic to be found in Supreme Court judgments, Nitirat was 
creating new forms of public scrutiny that made senior judges more accountable for their actions. 
These forms of scrutiny formed part of Nitirat’s modus operandi, deploying the law in order to 
practice political dissent. 
 
PRACTICING DISSENT 
 
How should Nitirat’s activities be characterised? The range of its activities extended well beyond 
academic legal questions, to proposing bills, instigating campaigns for law reform, and opening 
up space for debate. By doing so, it deployed the law as a practice of dissent. This may be 
understood in two ways. 
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Nitirat’s proposals sought first and foremost to challenge the unprincipled behaviour of 
the legal fraternity. Their September 2011 proposal to nullify the legal consequences of the 2006 
coup was a prime example of this. By exposing how the legal system was selectively deployed  
in order to provide legitimacy for those who had gained power illegally, and simultaneously 
demonstrating how the law should have been used against these usurpers of power, Nitirat re-
deployed legalism, this time against coup-makers rather than on their behalf. Nitirat advanced a 
different role for lawyers who, rather than offering technical legal interpretations that invariably 
justified and legitimated the activities of those in power, would offer interpretations based on 
different ideological assumptions, principles or values that would support alternative ways of 
understanding, organising, and practicing politics. Nitirat’s critiques of the 2006 coup and the 
laws promulgated in its wake offered a serious challenge even to those who rejected them. 
Nitirat’s aspiration to draft a new constitution also reflects this strategy. Unlike past constitutions 
drafted by lawyers who “competed to serve authority,” Piyabutr conceived Nitirat’s constitution 
as a disruptive one: “it would put forward a new state ideology and provide a point of reference 
for critiquing the current constitution” (interview, Piyabutr). In other words, the Nitirat’s 
constitution would offer a definitive statement of progressive, rights-based legal principles. 
Second, Nitirat’s activities sought to counter a culture of self-censorship by fostering 
dissent through legal debates. Worajet admitted he did not believe the petition to amend lèse-
majesté would succeed, but he hoped that the move would promote debates both in parliament 
and the wider society (Matichon, July 31, 2012). Because the monarchy was often deemed to be 
sacred and inviolable, as Worajet put it, Nitirat saw the campaign as an act of “opening up space 
for discussion” (Thai Freedom, April 2-6, 2012). The proposal’s content was drafted with such a 
goal in mind. Worajet argued proposing to abolish the law was too simple and could shut down, 
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rather than open up, the issue (interview, Worajet). While the proposal was not ideal, it would 
prove “most difficult to argue against for those who do not agree” (Thai Freedom April 2-6, 
2012). By encouraging debate as to whether the penalties for Article 112 were excessive and out 
of step with other laws, Nitirat hoped to introduce legal arguments into a previously closed 
discursive realm, and promote a new culture of critical inquiry. As Worajet put it: “112 is merely 
a starting point in allowing Thai society to discuss the status of the monarchy from a broader 
perspective” (Thai Freedom April 2-6, 2012). In this sense, Nitirat conceived legal debates as a 
venue through which dissent could be articulated. The proposal to nullify the coup and the open 
letter to judges shared similar features. They both sought to raise the level of critical inquiry 
about politics and the broader society by proposing new laws and interpretations. 
In the Thai context, raising such critical questions directly to the public was a 
transgressive act. However, it was not the activities of Nitirat alone that stimulated criticisms of 
the monarchy, military and judiciary. Such criticisms were already available; the product of 
conflicts and tensions over how politics should or should not be organised, who should or should 
not be permitted to participate, and on what terms. What Nitirat brought to this debate was a new 
brand legal respectability: faces and voices that, because of their elite academic standing, 
technical expertise, and social status, could not be readily dismissed.  Nitirat’s respectable 
branding and carefully-crafted proposals offered new rallying points for those opposed to the 
conservative establishment. 
 
POSITIONING DISSENT 
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Nitirat defies ready classification, deploying multiple identities for a range of different purposes. 
Its members’ relationship with the Thammsat University law faculty is an intimate and complex 
one. Nitirat’s membership is strictly limited to academic staff of the faculty. As Thapanan stated 
in an interview: “you must understand that though we are not exclusive, the path that the seven 
of us took didn’t emerge out of nowhere. It was a path that had both roses and rocks. Many 
spotlights are shining on us. Asked whether we could have more members, of course, but we 
would want to take time to accept them…”. Nitirat is a self-selecting grouping with a strong 
sense of its mission, operating within an elite sphere of society.  
At the same time, Nitirat was a kind of endangered species within Thammasat where its 
members have suffered various forms of hostility and exclusion. Sawatree explained that while 
many of the cleaners and janitors supported them, there was no overt support from colleagues, 
and quite a lot of hostility – some fellow lecturers would no longer talk to the Nitirat members or 
even look them in the eye (interview, Sawatree, November 14, 2012). Jantajira told a story about 
an incident shortly after the Article 112 proposals were announced. She walked into a room 
where two colleagues were talking. Both fell silent and ignored her greetings until she eventually 
left (interview, Jantajira Eiamayura, December 14, 2012). The rector of Thammasat, Somkit 
Lertpaithoon (interview, June 12, 2013), a former dean of the law faculty, claimed that Nitirat 
members never tried to reach out to colleagues and isolated themselves by assuming that others 
were against them, when this was not necessarily true. He insisted that Nitirat refused to attend 
the faculty’s annual meeting or to interview prospective law students with other faculty 
members. Somkit insisted that he himself had no problem with most of Nitirat’s proposals, only 
with the way its members behaved and introduced their ideas. 
27 
 
Thapanan claimed that most members of the faculty regard Nitirat as “crazy” for 
engaging in provocative moves that undermined their members’ academic standing and limited 
their chances of promotion (interview, Thapanan). Worajet insisted: “I still see us as an academic 
group…. There are those who respect us and are willing to follow. This didn’t happen because of 
us; we simply did academic work…. I have also always remained within the university’s gates 
(interview, Worajet). However, Nitirat’s critics often complained that the group had 
underwhelming academic credentials. Worajet is a full professor and Sawatree an assistant 
professor, while the others hold the entry-level academic status of “ajarn” (lecturer), and only 
four of the seven currently hold PhDs. While limited academic standing in no way invalidates the 
important arguments advanced, in Thailand’s hierarchical society the group is vulnerable to the 
charge of failing to “earn their spurs” before adopting outspoken critical stances – a view echoed 
even by some colleagues who share their progressive thinking. 
Nitirat’s entitlement to the “academic immunity” (a degree of critical license, somewhat 
comparable with diplomatic immunity) granted by lecturer status in society has been repeatedly 
challenged.10 At one point around 23 academic lawyers joined together to oppose Nitirat, 
accusing it of not listening to other people, distorting legal principles and engaging in 
academically unethical behaviour (Matichon, October 2, 2011). In February 2012, an anti-Nitirat 
protest called “Journalism Against Nitirat” was held at Thammasat, in which speakers called for 
Nitirat to be driven out of the university and even out of the country (Manager Online, February 
2, 2012). Many of those taking part were lecturers and graduates from Thammasat’s Faculty of 
Journalism. Ironically, the protest was held in front of a statue of Pridi. At the protest, a woman 
carrying a small pro-Nitirat banner had to be rescued from a hostile crowd by the police. 
Subsequently, Somkit apparently banned Nitirat from holding meetings on campus (Bangkok 
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Post, February 6, 2012), although he denied this (interview, Somkit). Later he relented on the 
ban, but special rules were introduced to set high fees of up to 50,000 baht for “external” groups 
renting rooms – rules which Nitirat members claimed were targeted at them (interview, 
Sawatree). 
From 2011 to 2013, Nitirat events held at Thammasat drew significant audiences. Most 
participants were not students or academics, and indeed many had never attended a university. 
Nitirat’s facility for public engagement has been both a strength and weakness. For the group’s 
supporters, their willingness to push the boundaries of what it meant to be a lecturer was 
provocative, progressive and exciting. For the group’s opponents, by contrast, Nitirat’s 
popularity was yet more evidence that the group was opportunistic, untrustworthy, irritating and 
even dangerous  
Piyabutr explained that their public outreach was inspired by Pridi’s emphasis on the idea 
of ratsadon (“the people”). In the wake of the April-May 2010 crackdown on the red shirt 
movement, many red shirt leaders faced legal charges or were lying low at home or abroad. 
Nitirat’s seminars drew a ready audience from red shirts seeking inspiration and leadership 
(interview, Piyabutr; interview, activist, February 23, 2013). Thapanan explained that they had to 
tailor their messages to this audience: 
 
When Nitirat goes public, there is an atmosphere of a classroom where we must be slow 
and clear. Worajet does this best. My friends and I really admire him. He is slow, clear, 
and precise. [When speaking to the public] I realise that sometimes, I have many thoughts 
that need to be managed immediately; Worajet does this even better than me. So you will 
see that he is a very good speaker (interview, Thapanan). 
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While the credibility and importance of Nitirat’s arguments derived from their status as 
lecturers at a prestigious university, this identity also boxed in Nitirat, limiting its capacity to 
have an impact beyond the university. To engage in celebrity-style practices such as brand-
building, and promoting leading figures such as Worajet and Piyabutr, would undercut the 
academic positioning on which their celebrity was based. This may account for Nitirat’s 
insistence that its members’ status as lecturers meant everything. As Thapanan explained in an 
interview, “Let me honestly tell you, Worajet and I came to the group with a similar standpoint: 
we want to be teachers.… So I think that’s a point that is already shared among us.”  
Despite their apparent pre-occupation with campaigning for radical changes to institutions and 
society, Nitirat’s members insisted that they really just wanted to be teachers. In fact, the group 
was seeking to redefine what teaching meant: being a teacher was not about preserving order, 
hierarchy, and prevailing social values, but about challenging them. The inspiration for this 
position is Pridi. Of the pre 1932 period, Pridi (2000, 35) wrote that he “[t]aught at the law 
school in a way to arouse, by stages, the consciousness of students to be interested in the 
necessity of changing the absolute monarchy to a form of monarchy under a democratic 
constitution.” Pridi’s course on administrative law, the first ever offered in Thailand, actually 
contained a good deal of politics and sociology (Pridi 2000, 36-60). Many of his law students 
later became members of the People’s Party. Nitirat’s members expressed interest in offering 
formal classes to a wider audience, thereby recovering Pridi’s ideal of an open university, though 
they had no way of realising this goal. To some degree, members of Nitirat saw themselves as a 
reincarnation of Khanarat. Worajet was asked “ Would you compare yourself to Pridi?” He 
responded: 
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No, I would not dare. First, we belong to a different time and context. Pridi was 32 [when 
the absolute monarchy was brought down], whereas I am already 43. It would be hard to 
compare. Of course, I may have more experience in terms of learning from mistakes and 
success. I know where Pridi went wrong and where he was right…. We do not say we are 
like Khana Ratsadon but we consider ourselves contemporaries who have taken on their 
mission.… We are not Khana Ratsadon but we have taken up their ideas about 
democracy and equality which have yet to be fully realised, for further advocacy as much 
as we could. And as much as we achieve, the next generation could take over [the 
mission] until it is achieved, in which we do not know when that would be. But at least 
we would have tried it at one point in history (interview, Worajet). 
 
Nitirat’s agenda involved reviving the legacy and aspirations of those who had brought Siam’s 
absolute monarchy to an end, but subsequently failed to transform society along progressive 
lines. 
Was Nitirat a political movement and were its members political activists? Thammasat rector 
Somkit insists they were (interview, Somkit). the latter but Nitirat members were reluctant to 
accept these labels. A related question concerned the connection between Nitirat and the red shirt 
movement. Since 2011, their events had been packed with cheering red shirt supporters, and 
Nitirat had come to be seen as a think tank for the pro-Thaksin movement. Ironically, Worajet 
had been an early critic of Thaksin. 
Asked about their relationship with the red shirts, Worajet was clear: 
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None, I affirm this. The relationship is like this. When Nitirat was created, we were not 
concerned about red shirts at all. We speak academically. However, the principles that we 
speak of happen to “serve” and “satisfy” red shirts. The red shirts felt they lacked 
academics who could speak like this because most academics are yellow shirts. But we 
don’t claim to be red; we simply talk out of principles, which happen to contradict the old 
groups and “serve” the red shirts (interview, Worajet). 
 
On the issue of Nitirat as a political movement, Worajet explained: 
 
I still see us as an academic group. However, the academic topic is closely related to 
politics and when we express ourselves, it has a political impact. I still see myself this 
way; not a political movement which tries to get into a position of authority.… But if you 
define political movements as not necessarily desiring positions of authority, then we 
may be one, based on our impact. Nowadays, I think it may be difficult for us to assume 
that status since Nitirat has become an idol that people cheer on and admire. There are 
those who respect us and are willing to follow. This didn’t happen because of us but 
rather others; we simply did academic work. In this sense, the question of whether we are 
a political movement depends on how we define one. If we are, we are not the same as 
those that existed before. But we would also be a political movement with many 
limitations. (interview, Worajet) 
 
Thapanan offered the following argument: 
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I think we are clear about this issue. We work on creating an intellectual movement as 
academics.… If you are a political actor, your intentions are no longer making an 
academic contribution but rather of appealing to the people, which is what rhetoricians 
do: persuade. But we have never done that. We propose one, two, three, four, five, and if 
you do not want it, that is fine. [W]hen we discussed the issue of the Constitutional 
Court, we suggested the parliament fight the Constitutional Court’s authority. In the end 
Worajet said “If you do not do this, then that is up to you. You are the politicians and I 
am just speaking as an academic.” I never thought we had any power. I see this as the 
most gentlemanly manner of expressing academic opinions (interview, Thapanan). 
 
This kind of logic – that academics could urge politicians and the public to take specific action, 
without these suggestions constituting a political act – typified the ambiguity around Nitirat’s 
position. While acknowledging that Nitirat represented a political ideology, Jantajira was firm in 
rejecting the “political movement” label: 
 
We are definitely not a political group. Can we frame it this way? We do academic work 
but by the nature of our field, public law, it is related to politics. We do not have goals to 
change politics, as political parties or political movements do, but we do not deny that 
our academic work seeks to change the mind of people (interview, Jantajira). 
 
These descriptions of Nitirat as a new kind of political movement – one derived from academic 
work, with the purest of intentions, and no aspirations to attain power – again speaks to a kind of 
lofty detachment reminiscent of the disdain with which Thailand’s conservative traditional elite 
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typically views the political sphere. Nitirat members see themselves as a new breed of non-
political political activists. 
In similar vein, Piyabutr complained that people criticised him and suggested he was 
becoming a politician, when in fact “I want to teach, speak and do what I’m doing” (interview, 
Piyabutr). This implied aversion toward being labelled as political reflects the strength of the 
conservative discourse of “dirty-corrupted politicians” in Thailand (Connors 2007: 97). At least 
since Chamlong Srimuang’s election to the Bangkok governorship in 1985, some political 
candidates have sought electoral success by adopting the moral high ground, assuming anti-
politician rhetoric (McCargo 1997, 147). It is striking that Nitirat echoed this discourse despite 
its claims to be progressive – an example of the ambiguities evident in the group’s thinking. 
Despite its insistence that it was not a political movement, Nitirat enjoyed consistent support 
from red shirt activists. Asked about this, Nitirat members tended to respond that they “could not 
prevent” red shirts from attending their seminars. Thapanan was frank about the relationship 
Nitirat enjoyed with their audiences: 
 
I suppose you can’t deny the truth. If we are celebrities then they are the fan club. As I 
told you, it’s the nature of things. If we have fan clubs then we have to “keep” them but 
at the same time we must maintain our duty on par with the academic standard that is 
responsible to the public. I can’t just speak to please the red shirts without considering 
principles, academic rigour and reasoning. If some issues are too personal, then I don’t 
mention them. Perhaps I discuss them among my group. We are well aware of what is 
principled and that we must be responsible for what we say and to the public (interview, 
Thapanan). 
34 
 
 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see audiences for Nitirat as simply passive and adoring. 
Though arguably a “fan club;” the crowds did not hesitate to express their disagreements with 
speakers. Taking part in these events – often in cramped and stiflingly hot rooms – was an 
expression of solidarity, and an opportunity to hear about and debate matters close to their hearts. 
Nitirat could be understood and analysed on various different levels. On one level, this 
was a group of academics doing academic work on legal questions; on other levels, it functioned 
as a campaigning organisation and at times closely resembled a political movement. Though 
Nitirat members benefitted from their positions as legal academics at a prestigious university 
when they campaigned, they also rejected a more political label which could jeopardise their 
academic credibility and immunity. Some members of Nitirat, notably Piyabutr and Worajet, had 
achieved a high public profile which went far beyond conventional notions of Thai academics as 
public intellectuals. Though inspired by the aspirations of Pridi and the People’s Party, to date 
the group has not elaborated a broader set of economic and political positions; its proposals have 
been focused on legal reforms. 
 
NITIRAT’S CRITICS 
 
In response to their proposal to nullify the coup, conservative forces attacked Nitirat members 
claiming they were “Thaksin’s men.” They were accused of being academics in disguise who 
had a hidden agenda to expunge the former premier’s alleged crimes.11 Others attempted to 
undermine Nitirat members’ academic credentials through verbal assaults, calling the proposals 
dim-witted, idiotic, self-interested or partisan.12 Following the Article 112 campaign, the 
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Democrat Party seized the opportunity to try and drive a wedge between the ruling Pheu Thai 
Party and its red shirt followers. The Democrat Party called on the ruling party and red shirt 
leaders publicly to repudiate the Nitirat campaign (The Nation, January 17, 2012). Manager 
Weekly (January 21, 2012) newspaper cropped Worajet’s face onto a chimpanzee, dubbing the 
cover photo “Wora’jiak” – jiak is a monkey sound in Thai. The accompanying story claimed that 
Worajet was manipulating society against the monarchy. 
The Article 112 campaign triggered alarming calls for violence by conservative royalists 
– part of a long-standing enthusiasm for the use of violence to defend the state, as a mechanism 
of political control in a context where the challenge to royalist hegemony has become stronger 
and more overt. The Manager website was flooded with comments advocating violence against 
Nitirat. A royalist group called Khon thai huachai rak chat (คนไทยหวัใจรักชาติ – Thais Whose Hearts 
Love the Nation), rallied to the Supreme Court to submit a petition of 53,948 signatories, asking 
the judiciary to stop the destruction of the nation by Nitirat. On their way, they stopped in front 
of Thammasat to burn an effigy of Worajet. In the North, a threat was passed via a student to 
Nitirat members that they would be shot if they ventured up to Thammasat’s Lampang campus 
(Front Line Defenders 2012). These calls culminated in an assault against Worajet in late 
February 2012, when he was punched in the face and hit several times on the head in the law 
faculty car park, by thuggish twin brothers who had apparently attended the effigy burning 
(ASTV Manager, February 29, 2012).13 The twins claimed that they had acted independently, a 
claim viewed with scepticism by local police. The pair was publicly thanked by a royalist group, 
Siam Samakkhi (The Nation, March 4, 2012). 
Many royalists consider Nitirat as a group of closet republicans, proposing subversive 
bills in order to gradually undermine or “bring down” the monarchy (ลม้เจา้). In an interview, 
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royalist Komsan Pokpong (June 5, 2013) claimed: “In their minds, they definitely want to 
overthrow the monarchy.” Komsan is a member of Siam Pracha Piwat, a group of royalist 
academics. Nitirat members insisted that clarifying the monarchy’s constitutional role was an 
entirely different objective from “overthrowing” the institution. 
Not everyone in the progressive camp agreed with the way Nitirat sought to combine 
academia and campaigning. Some of the most interesting commentary on Nitirat is offered by 
critical sympathisers. A progressive academic who shared many of Nitirat’s views argued that 
the group was insufficiently versed in the realities of Thai society, tending to apply Western 
ideas rather than working closely with ordinary people. For him, Nitirat was an integral part of 
the metropolitan elite (interview, academic, August 31, 2012 
A problem with Nitirat, identified by some critical sympathisers, was its tendency to 
issue fully-formed proposals which were not based on any consultation. As already noted, many 
CCAA 112 members wanted to abolish the lèse-majesté law, but Puangthong observed: “Even 
among the hundred academics that signed, not all of them agreed with the proposal entirely. 
However, they agreed to sign … because they probably similarly thought that you could not 
change it after all” (interview, Puangthong). 
One activist who worked closely with Nitirat explained that it were not interested in 
alternative ideas, and was not influenced by the views of followers: “They [Nitirat] just say what 
they want and then it ends.… I do the work that follows” (activist interview, February 4, 2013). 
Asked whether Nitirat looked down on others, a member of the Article 112 campaign said, “this 
is the character of those in the legal field, in which Nitirat is no exception” (interview, Wad 
Ravee). Another declared: “I don’t want the atmosphere of people waiting to hear what Nitirat 
has to say, though Thai society may be used to [ready-made products] from listening to the 
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king’s speeches (interview, activist, January 30, 2012). Overall, Nitirat members’s attempts to 
maintain their academic standing and distance themselves from politics emulated some of the 
very tendencies displayed by the traditional establishment, such as the judiciary, that they had 
strongly criticised: top-down didacticism, detachment from society, and preoccupation with 
preserving professional (or even vocational) image and standing. 
More than half of those who attended Nitirat events were red shirts who were there 
primarily to show political support.14 Cheers erupted whenever Nitirat condemned or ridiculed 
the state for injustice or unequal treatment; but disapproval was voiced if speakers criticised 
Thaksin (interview, journalist, January 21, 2013). By framing political issues as legal ones, 
Nitirat limited critical discussion of the proposals’ contents to those with legal expertise. Only 
legal academics and a couple of prominent historians have seriously engaged with and criticised 
Nitirat’s legal arguments (interview, Phuttipong). Nitirat was aware of the challenge their 
audiences faced. Comparing Nitirat seminars to law classes, Sawatree remarked, “If a hundred 
people came and ten understood what we are saying, then I am satisfied” (interview, Sawatree). 
Another problem with Nitirat’s approach was that legal solutions – proposing new laws and 
amending existing ones – were not always appropriate to address essentially political problems. 
When Nitirat came up with a draft bill for political amnesty in April 2012, it went nowhere and 
the mainstream media hardly covered it. Most redshirts were already satisfied with an amnesty 
bill drafted earlier by government member of parliament Worachai Hema. There was already a 
glut, rather than a shortage, of draft bills. The real obstacle to passing an amnesty law was the 
lack of a political consensus, not a lack of legal options. 
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Reflecting on Nitirat’s proposals, Piyabutr said, “I plan to decrease these activities.… 
Even if we make many proposals, they will not be successful. This is because of politics; no 
political side would accept [them]” (interview, Piyabutr). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Nitirat has brought a new dimension to Thai politics. During the 1970s, student leaders played a 
prominent role in calling for social and political change, organising mass rallies to articulate their 
demands. By the 1990s, some of this role had been assumed by public intellectuals who were 
often academics turned newspaper columnists. During the twenty-first century, much of the 
critical debate migrated online. Many of the most heated online exchanges have been inspired by 
Nitirat. Its members were more than just popular academics, becoming academic celebrities. 
Like many celebrities, the Nitirat members provoked mixed feelings among the public, with 
some adoring them and others being filled with violent rage towards them. 
Nitirat’s members were, first and foremost, academic lawyers, which was both a strength 
and a weakness. Because of their academic credentials, Nitirat members were able to offer 
substantive critiques on a range of issues, including the legitimacy (or otherwise) of legal moves 
following the 2006 military coup, the quality of verdicts issued by the Courts of Justice and the 
Constitutional Court in various prominent cases, the possibility of reforming the controversial 
lèse-majesté law, and revising the constitution. 
One contentious aspect of Nitirat’s advocacy, however, was a tendency to propose 
legalistic solutions to complex political problems. The lèse-majesté law was a case in point. 
Many conservatives and royalists agreed that the law needed to be reformed, but rather than 
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make common cause with those who had adopted similar positions, in 2012 Nitirat went out on a 
political limb by drafting a new lèse-majesté law which still included jail terms for those 
convicted, and then gathered signatures in support of their proposal only from one end of the 
political spectrum – the red shirt movement and its sympathisers. While Nitirat was correct that 
the lèse-majesté law needed reforming, its proposed solution pleased few of their own 
supporters. In similar fashion, Nitirat (see 2012) also proposed an ill-conceived amnesty bill – 
which fell flat – and hasty, muddled plans to abolish the Constitutional Court and replace it with 
a new body less capable of opposing the parliament. Nitirat also began drafting a new 
constitution, in a country which already holds the world record for drafting constitutions. 
Members of Nitirat appeared not to see that Thailand’s culture of hyper-legalism, like its culture 
of hyper-royalism, might be part of the problem in that more laws are not in themselves the 
answer to complex political problems. In certain respects, Nitirat emulated the conservative 
establishment it critiqued, favouring top-down legalistic utterances, and maintaining a certain 
lofty distance from “the people” (ratsadon) with whom it sought to engage. 
But despite its limitations and shortcomings, Nitirat performed invaluable political 
functions. By deploying the law as a practice of dissent, opposing mainstream narratives and 
explanations, exposing the hypocrisy and opportunism of the legal establishment, and above all 
by subjecting the judiciary to an unprecedented degree of sustained critical scrutiny, Nitirat 
articulated a shifting social landscape. The conservative elite could no longer maintain the same 
conditions of domination as before. Nitirat was especially effective in exposing the complicity 
between Thailand’s legal establishment and those who sought to subvert electoral democracy. 
Nitirat was not the People’s Party, and 2012 was not 1932. But for the first time since the 
1970s, royalism faced a serious intellectual challenge from progressive political forces. To be 
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clear, Nitirat had not itself created this challenge; rather, the group capitalised upon seismic 
changes in Thai society which had shifted the ground from beneath the feet of the royalist elite. 
Nitirat forged a new role for public intellectuals, grounded in academia but reaching out to a 
genuinely mass audience. In doing so, Nitirat served an important need for red shirt supporters – 
many of a lower social class – to whose aspirations the group gave voice, and for whom Nitirat 
had become a badge of honour and a solidarity marker. In an increasingly authoritarian context, 
Nitirat provided a legitimising face and a voice for particular coalitions of social forces and 
interests denied the political space to openly organise and express their interests. While Nitirat 
sometimes “worked” its audience, that same audience was sometimes also “working” Nitirat, 
seeing in them an opportunity to gain more legitimacy in their struggle to express and pursue 
their political interests. At the same time, Nitirat also achieved remarkable success in branding 
dissent as middle class, smart, and “cool” – important pre-requisites to mainstreaming the 
group’s ideas. 
In the wake of the May 2014 military coup, the important debates that Nitirat helped 
stimulate were almost completely suppressed. Familiar faces such as Wissanu Kruangam and 
Bowornsak Uwanno were soon back at work, drafting yet another constitution for the generals. 
Nitirat’s successful branding of dissent backfired when the group was quickly identified by the 
NCPO as a potential threat.15 Worajet and Sawatree were promptly summoned for questioning 
(see Prachatai June 18, 2014). While Sawatree was soon released from detention, Worajet was 
subsequently court-martialed for twice defying the NCPO’s summonses. Nitirat was obliged to 
adopt a low profile, joining activities only on an individual basis. Yet in the longer term, the 
always dissenting, often provocative, and invariably legalistic arguments Nitirat had raised about 
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the military, the monarchy, the judiciary, and the legal profession remained more salient than 
ever. 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 For details of Worajet’s 2014 case, a database of his case can be found on iLaw’s website, as of 
February 9, 2015. There are more details on the Thai version of the page than the English one. 
 
2 The second unofficial associate preferred not to be named. 
 
3 Pridi was the first Thai to gain the French degree of Docteur en Droit, and became a judge at 
the age of 27. He served for a time as regent, and was briefly prime minister in 1946. 
 
4 All three jurists were part of the toppled Thaksin regime as well as the post-coup regime. 
Borwornsak had been cabinet secretary-general to former premier Thaksin Shinawatra before 
abruptly resigning in 2006 and reverting to a conservative royalist stance. Wissanu was 
Thaksin’s deputy premier for four years; like Borwornsak, he resigned shortly before the 2006 
coup, following political pressures from the anti-Thaksin movement. Meechai served as the 
president of the Senate from 1992-2000 before becoming a legal advisor for the Thaksin-led 
government from 2001 to 2006. After the 2006 interim constitution was promulgated following 
the military coup, Borwornsak joined the drafting assembly for the 2007 constitution, Meechai 
became the chair of the junta-appointed parliament, and Wissanu became a member of that 
parliament. 
 
5 The lèse-majesté law, Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, reads “Whoever defames, insults 
or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of three to fifteen years.” Lèse-majesté is commonly referred to as “112.” 
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6 The official translation of Article 7 of the 1997 Thai Constitution states: “Whenever no 
provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with 
the constitutional practice in the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the 
State.” Connors (2008b) rightly argues that that “traditions/conventions of government” is a 
better translation for the term ประเพณีการปกครอง than “constitutional practice.” 
 
7 See Worajet (2011) and Sawatree (2011) (Nitirat Announcements 16 and 17) for the arguments 
presented at the seminars in written form. 
 
8 Details of CCAA 112 activities may be found on their website (Thai only) but after the 2014 
coup, the junta closed down and it could only be accessed from outside Thailand.  
 
9 The Constitutional Court did not come under the jurisdiction of the regular judiciary, but was a 
special independent agency – albeit one that was often politicized. To complicate matters, 
following the 2006 coup the Constitutional Court was temporarily replaced by the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which performed substantially the same functions. 
 
10 Nitirat members have always been extremely careful to avoid violating the lèse-majesté laws, 
recognising that to cross this line would invalidate their academic immunity. 
 
11 See “Nitirat Effect” (SIU 2011) for a collection of verbatim commentaries on Nitirat’s 
proposal from different news outlets. In particular, see the statements of General Somjet 
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Boonthanom (Manager, September 20, 2011), a former junta leader; Prapan Khunmee and 
Tuang Anthachai (ASTV, September 20, 2011), members of the junta-appointed parliament; and 
Democrat Party politicians Abhisit Vejjajiva (ASTV, September 19, 2011) and Thawon Senniam 
(MCOT, September 19, 2011). 
 
12 Similarly, see “Nitirat Effect” (SIU 2010). In particular, see the statements of PAD leader 
Pipop Thongchai (Manager Online, September 23, 2011) and Thai Post editor and columnist, 
Pleo Si Ngoen (Thai Post, September 22, 2011). 
 
13 The twins were sentenced to six months in jail, which was reduced in half because they 
confessed to their crime. 
 
14 Based on observations by authors while attending these events in 2012 and 2013. 
 
15 Coup leader General Prayudh Chan-ocha had previously described Nitirat as “abnormal.” See 
Saksith Saiyasombath’s blog on this on the Asian Correspondent website, February 7, 2012.  
 
